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Abstract
Scientists and philosophers routinely talk about phenomena, and the ways in which
they relate to explanation, theory and practice in science. However, there are very
few definitions of the term, which is often used synonymously with “data”, “model”
and in older literature, “hypothesis”. In this paper I will attempt to clarify how
phenomena are recognized, categorized and the role they play in scientific episte-
mology. I conclude that phenomena are not necessarily theory-based commitments,
but that they are what explanations are called to account for, which are not presently
explained.
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1. Introduction
In a well-known and generally debunked story, Inuit people have around 50 words
for snow. Or so the argument by anthropologist Franz Boas goes1. In fact, people
who engage with the phenomena of their environments often make distinctions that
those who rarely or never engage in the same way with those phenomena don’t. Snow
is a salient aspect of boreal environments; it matters whether the snow is packed,
or loose, falling or not, just as those in less severe environments make distinctions
about varieties of rain. Are these special terms or just adjectival nouns? How much
categorization of the world is too much, or too little?
The idea that our experienced world is constructed from our linguistic distinctions
is an old one, going back to Wilhelm von Humboldt in the early nineteenth century
(and possibly much earlier, all the way back to Plato, (Wolff and Holmes 2011)). Sapir
(a student of Boas’) and Whorf (Sapir’s student) proposed a thesis, well-known as the
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, that our categories determine how we experience the world.
This is known as linguistic determinism, either of our cognition, or our ontology, of the
world. The ruling notion here is that ideas (or linguistic structures and terms) specify
our experience.
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1Boas documented 60 words for ice, snow and related phenomena; and the debunking itself may need debunk-
ing. See Krupnik and Mu¨ller-Wille (2010)
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Science finds itself dealing with this issue constantly. I am most interested in species
concepts, but similar issues arise with gene (see Portin (1993)), individual (see Wilson
and Barker (2017)), niche (Colwell 1992; Leibold et al. 1997) and even such funda-
mental terms as ecology, environment, and even development (Keller and Lloyd 1992).
And that is just in biology. Chemistry has its categorical issues (Scerri 2007), as does
physics. Even mathematics has it (Lakatos 1978).
Why is this? Science is supposed, or so I was taught, to be increasingly specific and
exact in its terms. Each term is refined and redefined to apply to classes of phenomena
that are real, causal, and important theoretically. We know that the social sciences
have the problem: terms like religion, society, folkway, class, and so on are routinely
held to be constructed kinds, and terms like gender, race, and other identity terms
have a strong political overtone as well. And yet, categorical terms persist. Why?
There are a few explanations on offer. One is that our language evolved for func-
tional, usually economic, reasons. We identify the categories we do due to something
akin to Marx’s notion of false consciousness, in which we speak of the world in ways
that are imposed for socioeconomic reasons (which serve the interests of the powerful).
Let us call that the Marxian explanation. Another is that we identify the categories
that suit our metaphysical, ontological or theoretical worldview. I call that the Weltan-
schauung explanation2. Both have their defenders.
The Marxian account is often employed by those called postmodernists, or struc-
turalists. It suggests that concepts are relative to interests. Change the interests and
you change the concepts. Such conceptual relativity gives primary causal roles to the
conditions in which ideas develop. It is often used to suggest that truth is a matter of
functional coherence in a social sense. The truth of the scientific image (Van Fraassen
1980) is not comparable with the truth of, say, the magical thinking of the Asante
people in West Africa. They are in their own ways equally ”valid”.
The Weltanschauung account implies that our best theory in science, religion or
economics (which is neither) licenses the categorization of the world. In short, as
Quine once wrote, to be is to be the value of a variable in some theory. This implies,
as Ludwig Fleck (cf. Lo¨wy 1988) and Thomas Kuhn both noted (as part of another
old tradition in philosophy) that if your theory changes, so too do your commitments
to what is in the world. And moreover, these commitments are not commensurate.
Newton’s use of the term mass is not the same as Einstein’s. This is an essentialistic
account of categories: the theory defines the class in terms of intensional theoretical
properties. This is also known as scientific realism and holds that things exist only if
they are aspects of our best theory.
Both of these views are set against the empiricist view, which was widely held until
the nineteenth century, despite Hume and Kant rejecting it. This held that one merely
has to observe the world in order to categorize it3. Pierre Duhem, the physicist of
the late nineteenth century, attacked naive empiricism in favour of his Kantian view
that phenomena are determined by one’s theoretical concepts (Duhem 1954, chapter
II), and this became the default view after the collapse of Logical Positivism in the
1950s. The logical positivists held there were two languages in science—one based
upon observational operations, and one based upon theoretical concepts and prop-
erties. This theory-observation dichotomy failed in the fact of the highly theoretical
2Tied to the Weltansichten of a national language by Humboldt.
3Discussions of “phenomena” are widespread in the nineteenth century and earlier, for example, but there
are few to no specifications of the term. Newton, for instance, simply lists unsolved problems in his Principia
under the heading “Phenomena”
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nature of observations in, specifically, physics. Phenomena were not “ready-made”,
but constructed.
Constructionism of categories is thus the consensus among philosophers of science,
just as it was among anthropologists and linguists for a time. Sometimes it is social
construction, sometimes it is theoretical construction. Empiricists are naive. In re-
cent years, though, empiricism has been making a comeback. In particular Michaela
Massimi (2008a; 2011) has argued that while constructive empiricism such as van
Fraassen’s fails, the distinction made by Bogen and Woodward (1988) between data
and phenomena is correct:
Thus, the metaphysical framework is close to that of experimental realism, whereby (i)
phenomena such as weak neutral currents exist in the world ‘out there’; (ii) they manifest
themselves by causally producing data such as bubble chamber photographs, which we
then (iii) learn how to recognise from other data due to background noise via reliable
procedures. (2011, 103)
Massimi offers what she calls “scientific perspectivism” in which
Knowledge claims in science are perspective-dependent when their truth-conditions (un-
derstood as rules for determining truth-values based on features of the context of use)
depend on the scientific perspective in which such claims are made. Yet such knowledge
claims must also be assessable from the point of view of other (subsequent or rival)
scientific perspectives. (2016, 13)
Hence, while a perspective depends upon the theoretical issues and rules of a discipline
or investigation, it must be cross checked by other perspectives. Massimi holds this is
a kind of realism.
2. Phenomena and perspectives
A phenomenon is noteworthy. A phenomenon is discernible. A phenomenon is commonly
an event of a certain type that occurs regularly under certain circumstances. The word
can also denote a unique event that we single out as particularly important. When we
know the regularity exhibited in a phenomenon we express it in a law-like generalization.
The very fact of such a regularity is sometimes called the phenomenon. (Hacking 1983,
221)
If claims to know the reality of things depend on our prior knowledge in this way,
by cross checking from other fields and theories, can we ever say that we do really
know things? Isn’t it the case that all we know is what coheres with our experiences
and our existing knowledge? Are our categories of the world just social constructions?
This debate has raged for decades among linguists, philosophers and social scientists.
Those who go full constructivist say that each culture, or even each individual, has
their authorities, sources, beliefs and religions. In other words, it’s perspectives all the
way down.
Those who go full realist, though, want to anchor our categories in hard facts,
universally accessible and confirmable. Sure, we have perspectives, but get enough
of them together and you converge upon the joints of nature (appealing to Plato’s
“cut nature at its joints” comment, Phaedro 265e). Popper once approvingly quoted
Churchill about the mathematical prediction of a solar eclipse:
You . . . look, and your sense of sight immediately tells you that their calculations are
vindicated . . . We have taken what is called in military map-making ’a cross bearing’.
We have got independent testimony to the reality of the sun. When my metaphysical
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friends tell me that the data on which the astronomers made their calculations [of an
eclipse] were necessarily obtained originally through the evidence of their senses, I say
’No’. (Popper 1972, 43)
In other words, said Popper, we gain our knowledge intersubjectively. Such cross
bearings are held by Popper among others to converge upon a theory-observation
pairing of the world that indeed cuts at the joints. Theory comes to present a structural
description of the world that breaks things into their real objects, classes and relations
(this is known as “structural realism”, Psillos (2006)). This way, we develop a number
of categories of things like atoms, fields, orbits and other aspects of the world-as-it-is,
even if incompletely or partially. Or so the story goes.
Both of these accounts may be true of some categories, but I doubt they hold for
all of our scientific categories. In fact, even when categorical structure converges, it
retains a constructed aspect (why wouldn’t it? The terminology and technical lan-
guage of science is hardly discovered “out there”), and no constructed category that
is empirically inadequate, as van Fraassen noted, is scientific.
But there is another way we gather our concepts and categories. It is termed “folk”
science. For instance, living kinds are usually distinguished by cultures in a fairly
predictable fashion, as Berlin and his collaborators have shown (Berlin 1973, 1976,
1992; Berlin et al. 1973). According to this view, traditional societies begin with what
they term a “unique beginner”, then “life form”, then generic, then specific, then
varietal (see Figure 1 from Berlin et al. (1973)). This closely approximates Linnaeus’
kingdom–class–genus–species–variety hierarchy.
Similar folk hierarchies have been proposed by Bulmer and Tyler (1968) and Scott
Atran (1985; 1990; 1998; 1999). Moreover, folk psychology and folk rules for weather
prediction and so forth have similar hierarchies, which itself is a reason why the hier-
archies of traditional logic held such sway, as they formalized folk categorization and
practices. Now, in the case of ethnobiology (or ethnopsychology, etc.), clearly these
shared categories are not based on science and theory, and yet again and again such
categories have been shown to have close correlations with scientific categories (and of
course some surprising differences). Moreover, Linnaeus and his predecessors named
species, in the absence of much scientific theory, that have remained species up to 500
years later. In my book (Wilkins 2018) I document cases of medieval classifications
being ”natural”, in the sense of being categories still accepted in modern biology. If
empiricism is false, and theory is absent, how did these categories come to be? Is it
just accidental? Or are the phenomena ready-made in some non-trivial sense?
2 PHENOMENA AND PERSPECTIVES 5
By focusing on the theory–observation dichotomy so exclusively, philosophers of
science of the past tended to overlook the phenomenality of categories in both wider
culture and science4. Initially, when a field has no theory to speak of (other than
ancillary theories in related or technical disciplines like optics), the guiding principle
for categorization is experienced observation. To illustrate with an anecdote or two:
A few years back I happened to host a world-renowned American bryophytologist
in Sydney, so I took him to the location in the Blue Mountains where Darwin had
gone while on his Beagle voyage. I expected naively that he would find the vistas
breathtaking and the sense of history would be his focus. Instead, we hardly got out
of the carpark, as he found some liverworts with gametophore stages. He thanked me
profusely, much to my consternation, for taking him there. I could barely see them
except as background plant-like things on the car park embankment.
A year or so later, a well-known coleopterist, specializing in a group of beetles that
have many representatives in Australia, visited from the US, and so his host and I took
him out into the bush. As we wandered, I was impressed that he not only knew where
to look for the beetles, but that he could even see them in the undergrowth and litter.
I couldn’t. To him, they leapt out in his field of vision —he had the search image in
his head and literally saw them as patterns in the mess. I was unable to identify the
phenomena I should for this purpose, while he was an expert observer, filtering out
the noise to spot the targets. In a later trip I got to see something of how he did it,
but not much. I lacked, and still lack, the professional learning and experience.
In many ways, this is like the ways a traditional hunter hunts. A trained hunter sees
the prey even when camouflaged or obscured. They know where to look and what to
look for. Successes in the past, and folk lore, reinforce those observational techniques
that will find the natural types of things being hunted5. A forager is the same: they
see the indications of useful plants and animals that can be used for food, medicine
and cultural purposes. If your living depends on getting the natural world (mostly)
right, experience tends towards the right phenomena.
There is not much in the way of theory here. Neither is the observation naively
empiricist, nor is it just evolved predispositions, or else I would have had no problems at
least seeing the differences that identified these types. This is culturally-scaffolded and
experienced observation that converges, out of necessity, on natural phenomena. There
are several aspects here. One is that of course observation of any kind relies initially
upon our evolved predispositions to respond to certain types, scales, and duration of
phenomena. We do not respond observationally to very slow processes, which we tend
to normalize as the “natural” state of affairs (akin to the supposed quote of Einstein’s,
that “Common sense is nothing more than a deposit of prejudices laid down by the
mind before you reach eighteen”). We do not respond to the very rapid either, treating
it as noise or static. But at the mesoscale, we do respond observationally to a good
many natural phenomena, which are handed to us by our evolved senses, and these
can be truth tracking even though they evolved, mostly, as fitness enhancers. When
our fitness depends on getting observations right, we evolve truthful senses.
But that is not enough. No single set of observations or the experience of a single
person is going to engage with enough of the world to develop what we might call
“well-formed categories”. Evolution sacrifices false negatives on the altar of false pos-
itives (Wilkins and Griffiths 2013; Griffiths and Wilkins 2014). So a different process
aggregates and selects out the experiences of many: cultural evolution. We are trained
4As I continually find, Ian Hacking is a notable exception. See chapters 9–13 of his 1983
5Sterelny (2003) refers to this kind of cultural cognitive development as “scaffolding”.
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by our peers, and the expertise of others is passed on, sometimes as rules, yes, and
definitions, but mostly as setting up the framework in which individual learning, trial
and error, will home in on the “right” categories. Thus, three factors determine ob-
serving phenomena: the heredity of biology, and of culture, and individual experience.
Each selects out as much error as it is worth eliding, but cultural evolution and indi-
vidual experience are faster and much more efficient at removing error than biology,
so long as the success is sufficiently cogent. Finding food, for example, is much more
significant than finding a decorative feather.
All that is (conceptually and historically) before science even enters the race. How-
ever, it explains why folk taxonomies are often quite robust in the light of the concep-
tual selection processes of technically advanced sciences; as a first cut, folk taxonomies
are not too bad at identifying real phenomena. If they were, people would die, or lose
fitness overall. But ethnotaxonomy is not foolproof; which comes as no surprise, and
it can be overturned by cultural factors if the costs are outweighed by the benefits.
To give the classical example, let us consider Bulmer’s classical paper: “Why is the
Cassowary is not a Bird?” (Bulmer 1967). Bulmer noted that of the New Guinea tribe,
the Karam, that
. . . at the smallest units which Karam discriminate, the ’terminal taxa’ . . . Karam show
an enormous, detailed and on the whole highly accurate knowledge of natural history,
and that though, even with vertebrate animals, their terminal taxa only correspond well
in about 60 per cent. of cases with the species recognised by the scientific zoologist,
they are nevertheless in general well aware of species differences among larger and more
familiar creatures.
However, he said, at the upper level of classification
. . . objective biological facts no longer dominate the scene. They are still important,
but they allow a far greater, almost infinitely varied, set of possibilities to the taxonomist.
This is the level at which culture takes over and determines the selection of taxonomically
significant characters.
For cultural reasons, the cassowary, which walks on two legs but does not fly, is
regarded by the Karam as “human” and thus is forbidden to be killed or eaten. Clearly
cultural exigencies overcome the natural in this case. But, and this is not often noted,
adopting the arbitrary categorical standards of one’s culture, particularly when it
costs you some missed opportunity, is a good way to enhance your standing in the
community by demonstrating your commitment, and it raises your fitness (vis a´ vis
social aid) more than it lowers it (in terms of lost protein); so it is not surprising that
this occurs.
Consequently, we must expect that while a culture will categorize the environment in
which it exists in ways that to a degree track truth (that is, delineate real phenomena)
not all the natural categories of a culture will do so. Inuit may have multiple terms
for snow based on the ways they interact with snow, but the having of multiple terms
doesn’t mean that the categories they name are somehow dividing nature at its joints.
I just used the term phenomenon. What does that mean? The etymology gives us
a clue: it comes from the Greek word phainomai (φαίνομαι), meaning ”appearance to
the senses”. Leaving aside phenomenological philosophy, which is mostly about the
subjective elements of cognition, in our context, this means a phenomenon is not self-
standing. It is a two place predicate: P appears to O. The world has many, possibly
an infinite number of clusterings of things. A phenomenon is one that an observer
O observes. Now a phenomenon can be something that exists, such as when I note
that doors permit egress when open but not when closed. Or it can be something that
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bears no truthful relation to the world, such as when I see eyes in leaves while on LSD
[which the Greeks called phantasia, (φαντασία)]6.
Scientific phenomena tend to eliminate the latter kind in favor of the former. A
phenomenon in science relies on a good observational system as well as real clusters of
properties in the world. So what counts as a scientific phenomenon is not defined by
the categories of folk science/culture/psychology. Instead it depends upon the use of
scientific instruments, techniques and methodologies, as well as the use, when available,
of theories. If we get 50 words for snow out of that, we can have a reasonable confidence
that we are delineating natural properties, given that these operations of science have
been honed over time to be successful at exactly that.
3. The economics of cultural categories
If experienced observers are trained to observe natural phenomena in their environ-
ment, pace the “interference” of cultural accidents, what is it they observe? As I men-
tioned before, we are not born into a world of ready-made phenomena. William James
referred to the sensory world of a newborn baby as a “blooming, buzzing confusion”:
Experience, from the very first, presents us with concerted objects, vaguely continuous
with the rest of the world which envelops them in space and time, and potentially divisible
into inward elements and parts. These objects we break asunder and unite. . . . The baby,
assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin and entrails at once, feels it all as one great blooming,
buzzing confusion; and to the very end of life, our location of all things in one space is
due to the fact that the original extents or bignesses of all the sensations which came to
our notice at once, coalesced into one and the same space. (James 1890, 487–488)
But if the world is divisible in so many ways, why do we divide our experiences in the
ways we do? What makes some aspects of our immediate environment salient? That
is, why do some stimuli have more importance than others for us? That there are
phenomena in the objective world is not at issue. But there are an indefinitely large
number of possible ways to carve the world up in our categories. We must be able to
make a start. What James did not know, in 1890, is that there is a prior set of what
one might think of as neurological guidelines for making sense of the world. Mach,
and Lorenz following him, referred to this as the “evolutionary a posterioria” (Lorenz
1996). These are what Kant called the synthetic a prioria, that which we “know” to
begin with, but which we cannot have derived from logical truths.
Consider vision. We do not learn to see, we learn to interpret what we see. Assuming
normal development, the visual system functions at birth. However, control of the
system, focusing and the like, and the neural pathways necessary to process the inputs,
are not yet developed, and they need to kick off by individual adaptation, or neural
plasticity. But what to attend to in the beginning, if there is such a plurality of
alternatives? Evolution has provided a number of dispositions to attend to edges,
motion, and tonal variation (irradiance). James’ “objects” are the outcome of these
discriminatory dispositions we have at birth.
So our dispositions in a way “make” the phenomena we observe. This veers too
closely to the “constructed reality” version of our first section, though. It is better to
say that a phenomenon P exists as a relation between the observer O, and the envi-
ronment being observed E. O has a set of prior dispositions that make some aspects of
E salient. Some of these are biological dispositions, inherited through reproduction of
6See Hacking (1983, chapter 13) for more information on the history of the term 11phenomenon”.
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the organisms. Some of these are sociological dispositions, based upon, yes, language,
folk taxonomy, and social institutions like (for example) scientific social practices. And
some are simply categories that we are disposed by our cultural biases to slot observa-
tions into. We do not construct our natural categories so much as negotiate them with
the external world at varying degrees of distance from our individual dispositions. We
could do a pseudo equation:
P = O[b, s, c] · E[d]
where the observer’s dispositions of biology (b), societal context (s) and culture (c)
modulate with the local environment (based on distance d from O) to produce a
phenomenon. The “weight” of each variable determines how “natural” the phenomenon
is. Visualized as a continuum, when the variables of s and c are low, and the stimuli
are very local, the phenomenon is something more likely to be objective, vis a vis our
perceptual apparatus, and hence “natural” or “real”. When s and c are high value,
the phenomenon is more likely to be a constructed (sociocultural) one. Assuming that
the selection process tends to make phenomena more accurate as representations of
the environment, we can represent phenomena like this (where “facts” are statements
of phenomena; i.e., categories). When selective pressure on the categories is low for
s and c, we have a more purely constructed category, as when philosophers come up
with a fake category for illustrative purposes (“gavagai”), or when a politician appeals
to some ideal that makes no sense (like the unregulated market as a way to achieve
the most rational distribution of resources), although once such a category is in play,
acceptance of it tracks the signaling aspect of categories, if not the factuality of the
content of the ideas they purport to represent.
This is not to say there is a sharp demarcation between sociological and cultural
“spaces”, nor between the sociocultural and the biological. Instead, human devel-
opment encompasses all three. Biology proffers dispositions to develop in particular
ways, sociology sets the constraints and resources, and culture sets the prior “art”, as
it were, that developing humans acquire and then set about modifying. Since all three
domains, as it were, are in my view about the acquisition and use of resources that
affect the fitness of the individuals, there is selection going on at all three levels, and
this is what defines them as domains in the first place.
We can illustrate this as if human development occurred upon a single spectrum (of
selective pressures)[see figure 3].
since trees and other nonsocial facts are not constructed by humans, while houses and
other social facts are constructed by social dynamics. Cultural facts are symbolic and
passed on through imitation and education. Moreover, what is a sociological fact can
affect the nonsocial and cultural and vice versa. Categories about each “domain” are
constructed to a degree, but what they are constructed to represent are environmen-
tal, and the environment is “natural” (that is, not socially constructed), sociological
(constructed to represent social organization and patterns) and cultural (constructed
to represent the symbolic milieu). Since humans always have constructed their envi-
ronment to a degree (the so-called “niche construction” hypothesis applied to humans,
Odling-Smee et al. 2003), we are now, and have always been, in our “natural” envi-
ronment. However, there is another way to conceptualize niche construction: as the
individual adaptive environment that buffers development against “strict” natural se-
lection. Organisms adapt individually within the degrees of freedom allowed by their
biology. When this has a cost to fitness, natural selection takes over.
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So natural selection, social selection and cultural selection represent three layers
of selective processes with the consequent differences in the rates of their evolution.
However, they are unlinked in many ways: cultural selection can be slower than so-
ciological and even biological—consider biological selection against diseases brought
about by trade, a social process, and the cultural changes that entails, for example.
This is a complex interplay of evolutionary forces. Still, the variables in my “equation”
can still be given values, if we can identify for any given trait, biological through to
cultural, what the modal values are. If not—if it is too complex to do so—we can still
understand what the forces are to a degree of precision allowed by the particular case.
The Karam category which includes humans and cassowaries, but not other birds,
is one example. It is constructed in opposition to natural facts, but adherence to it
signals commitment to the sociocultural order of the tribe. Another example is the
“uncleanness” of pigs among Jews and Muslims. In fact, the notion of clean and unclean
in most cultures serves not as a categorization of the facts about these food sources,
although that is the rationale for them, but as an honest signal you are tracking
cultural norms. When seen like this (admittedly a gross oversimplification) we can
now ask, at last, how it is that science can claim to be approaching, delineating, and
explaining, natural phenomena.
4. Species, a case study
All classificatory terms are impossible of exact definition. Their use always has and
always will depend upon the consensus of opinion of those best qualified by wisdom,
experience and natural good sense. They will never become stable; we shall never cease
to amend, to change, to repudiate old and propose new, because we shall never reach the
final summation of science. [S. W. Williston, “What is a species?”, American Naturalist,
(Williston 1908, 184–194)]
The term ‘species’ refers to a concrete phenomenon of nature and this fact severely
constrains the number and kinds of possible [species] definitions. (Mayr 1996, 263)
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We have come to understand that categories about the natural (i.e., the non con-
structed) world are not based on some naive notion of phenomena or observations,
but upon experienced (that is, expert) observations. Nevertheless they can be modu-
lated and biased by cultural and sociological factors. Let me talk present an example
close to my heart: species (and other taxonomic categories).
As is well-known (Wilkins 2018; Zachos 2016), scientists do not at all agree on what
species are. Nor, it must be said, do they agree on what counts as sufficient evidence
that two organisms are in different species; at least, not all of the time. And yet, the
standard view is that species are fundamental units of evolution, ecology, and the other
ways that we deal with the biological world. In my 2018 I argue that the very notion
of a “level” of biological taxa such as species is itself the outcome of sociocultural
factors—to wit, the need to work out what “kinds” meant in the Noah’s Ark story so
the logistics could be rationalized. If that is the origin, why does species persist among
scientists as a category?
As a PhD student, I attended a workshop that included the late John Maynard
Smith, and of course I took the opportunity to ask him about species (this was very
early on in my studies on the topic, so I had nothing profound to offer him), and to
eat half his sandwich. I asked him what he thought species were, and his response,
which I dismissed at the time, was that they were merely communicative terms, for
the convenience of biologists. I now know this was (in 2000) a common response
to the species problem by geneticists, but it shocked me. How could “species” help
communication, if they were not referring to anything? If the category was unreal, as
he suggested, then what were we talking about?
Other biologists, particularly Brent Mishler, have been saying this for some time:
“species” is an unnecessary rank in an otherwise rankless evolutionary process7. He,
and other species deniers, considered the very category nonscientific. I suggested some-
thing similar in 2003, but it was muddled. Against the deniers are the species realists,
who argue that species not only exist, but that there is a “level of organization” in
biology that answers to “species”. I have had papers rejected because reviewers took it
as an article of faith that there was such a level of organization not only in this or that
group, but across the entirety of biology (except, perhaps, single-celled microbes), and
the editors and reviewers would not accept a challenge to this view.
There is a distinction between category realism and entity realism about species
that needs to be attended to. Category species realism is the view that the category
is real as well as the individual entities that fall within it, and it is that which I
take aim at here (see also Mishler and Wilkins 2018). Entity realism is the view that,
individually, the entities (as populations, lineages, etc.) that get called species are real,
but the category is not natural. It occurs to me now that Maynard Smith may have
been right. We can refer to individual species like Homo sapiens, Mesoneura opaca,
and Alchorena ilicifolia (Ereshefsky 1998), even if they are not all of the same category
or type. I can have diverse things in my pocket: a coin, a lighter, and a ticket. They
do not need to be a natural kind to get referred to as “pocketed items”.
It looks very much as though species as a category is not natural in the “natural
kind” sense that philosophers have been talking about since Mill. Instead it looks
like the outcome of a series of more or less frozen accidents in theology, philosophy,
and science, for which retrospective justifications have been given as the needs arise.
In short, species is a cassowary—a purely cultural concept. Or is it? Several things
mitigate this rabid reductionism. One is that species are often named and retained
7E.g., Mishler (2010). See also Mishler and Wilkins (2018).
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for centuries, no matter how the science progresses. Many of the species identified in
the medieval period remain “good” species, for example, although their nomenclature
and arrangement in relation to other species have changed a lot. It seems that good
observers can identify things in the unconstructed world even in the absence of theory
and method held to be essential to good science. Another is that as I noted in the first
part, humans tend to find levels of categorization of the unconstructed world fairly
consistently and across cultures and times.
Hence my argument, given in my Wilkins and Ebach (2013), and expanded on in
Wilkins (2018), that species are phenomena. Given that natural phenomena are a
reciprocal arrangement between the unconstructed world and experienced observers,
and that we have a tendency to find patterns in the world, this explains why it is that
we so often find species in this or that group so obvious, even though there are multiple
boundary cases where they are not obvious at all. Species, and by extension to the
rest of science, natural categories, are patterns we match in observational data, based
on our prior experience of uncontested cases. They need not be, and often rarely are,
theory-based; but they are based on the practicalities of doing natural science. In some
disciplines, such as physics, one needs to be very theoretical to even observe microscale
and even mesoscale phenomena; but that doesn’t mean we are forced to be theoretical
in the observation of biological, geological or even astronomical phenomena; at least,
not all the time.
This goes to the main question of this essay: are the categories of science in any way
objective? To answer this, we need to discuss the role explanation plays in science, or
at least offer a rough sketch of it.
5. Constructing phenomena
There is a naive empiricist view, held by nobody on close inspection, that phenomena
merely present themselves to the observer, and call for explanation. At least since
Kant, such a view has been untenable, as Michela Massimi (2008b) has shown. As she
notes, it is well understood that phenomena are underdetermined by observational
data, and she plumps instead for the following view:
whenever we have prima facie rival potential causes for the same phenomena, in order to
distinguish between them and to determine which entity-with-causal-power has actually
produced the observed effect, we must in the end rely on a description of what causal
powers/capacities/dispositions an entity is to have so as to produce the observed effects.
This description is given by a scientific theory. [Quoted in Massimi (2011), from her 2004]
On the one hand, I agree that we need to have prior understanding of the causal
powers that produce our observations of phenomena, but on the other, I do not agree
that this is, necessarily, described by a scientific theory. To make any sense of that
view, and to support my whole pragmatist view of phenomena and explanation, I must
needs do a bit of work.
Let us begin with the naive empiricist. He says that in observing the world, certain
phenomena are ready made and call for explanation. But the Kantian replies that the
naive empiricist must choose what patterns in the data to include in the phenomenon,
and what to exclude as irrelevant or noisy. Imagine trying to program an AI to se-
lect the “right” patterns to call explanatorily relevant phenomena out of all possible
data sources, for instance8. Hence, she will say, the naive empiricist has no access to
8Cf. the “frame problem” in AI. [CITE STANFORD]
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phenomena until he has a theory of causality, relevance, and explanation in that (the
phenomena’s) domain.
But this leaves us with a Starting Problem. Bayesian logic will deal with this by
an iterative process of refining the prior probabilities based on new data, (asymptot-
ically?) approaching the correct patterns. But the naive first investigator (not neces-
sarily a naive empiricist) faces a field that has no scientific theory on which to draw;
no prior probabilities for that domain. How to commence? What should she pay at-
tention to? Bayes suggests an answer, and it has to do with how we extrapolate from
the general knowledge we have of the world to specialized domains.
Consider a phenomenon: the precession of Mercury. This is where the orbital peri-
helion itself moves slowly around the sun. It is as clear a phenomenon as you can find
in science, but it would not have been a phenomenon to the Ptolemaic astronomers for
the simple reason that they could not observe it without previously having adopted
both a heliocentric (or perhaps Keplerian) model of the solar system, and Newtonian
physics (as opposed to, say, Descartes’ vortex physics). Yet the observation of the
precession of Mercury’s perihelion could be done without very much in the way of the-
oretical knowledge, using measuring instruments that in no way depended upon either
theory. It simply was not an anomaly worth noting until the Newtonian/Copernican
model had been adopted, and it deviated from the expectations of that model. And
even then, it took around 150 years to show up as an anomaly.
With this (admittedly violently oversimplified) statement of the history of this issue,
let us draw some tentative inferences.
(1) Astronomers had an account of the causal powers that resulted in the obser-
vations – the transmission of light via optical lenses, along with assorted geo-
metrical and mathematical techniques. None of this required theory very much
theory. As Hacking 1983 noted, optical techniques were testable without these
theories, and the theory of the propagation of light was not finalized until after
this.
(2) Measurement is more important here than theoretical descriptions of these causal
powers, contra Massimi.
(3) Measurement is something that is independent of the phenomenon, and the
domain of explanation, that sets up the anomaly.
(4) The phenomenon calls for an explanation (and possibly, a new theory).
It seems from this example, and many others, that in order to identify a phe-
nomenon, one does need prior assumptions about what is “normal” or expected dy-
namics of the domain under investigation. How do we acquire these expectations, in
order to be able to construct the phenomena? The usual explanation is, as Massimi
says, that we rely on prior theory. And this is often, indeed in modern science, usually
the case. There’s a lot of theory in play in nearly all domains of scientific exploration.
Nobody starts an investigation nowadays without a slew of ancillary theory and tech-
niques. So we can concede that to the Kantian.
But the Starting Problem generalizes beyond individual cases of novel investiga-
tions. How did science itself get going? In the absence of prior theory of any real
utility, there has to be a process. I was taught, as an undergraduate, that there was
always a prior theory – Aristotle, Ptolemy, Galen, and so forth. But at some point as
we move back in time, the meaning of “theory”, as a set of models, techniques and
predictive results, fades away into religious and metaphysical speculation, superstition,
and cultural practices (literally: cultic behaviors like consulting oracles). Did science
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bootstrap itself into existence? If it did, that is a counterexample to the claim that we
use theory to construct phenomena. There are two approaches we might take to this
issue:
(1) Science evolved from quasi-scientific etiological accounts (origin stories of the
gods and the creation of the cosmos); and
(2) We have “theory” from our evolution as cognitively competent organisms.
Neither is all that compelling. Etiologies (like Hesiod’s Theogony) have a completely
different function to natural philosophical investigation. They are moralizing narra-
tives, not empirical tests and studies of the nonsocial world. And to call our evolved
cognitive predispositions a “theory” is to beggar the meaning of “theory” so completely
that anything is theory, a move I do not like at all. If “theory” has any meaning in
science, it must not be watered down to include our disposition to notice mesoscale
phenomena that we might eat, navigate, fear or copulate with.
And yet, that set of sensory dispositions is what does underpin scientific investiga-
tions. Most of our measuring tools are ways to represent at mesoscale what we cannot
otherwise see or notice. A telescope and a microscope both present phenomena in ways
we can use our evolved sensory apparatus to observe. However, as anyone who has used
either of these devices knows, some experience is required to interpret what is seen,
and the more a measuring device abstracts the microscale or macroscale, the more
training it takes to be able to interpret what is measured. Such things as molecular
assays, statistical analyses, cloud chambers, and x-rays all require more than naive
sensory processing [see note 5 in Bogen and Woodward (1988)].
This is why I have said that a phenomenon is something recognized by observa-
tion undertaken by a trained and experienced specialist9: it’s not just the observing
(concurring with Bogen and Woodward) and it’s not just based on theoretical de-
scription (concurring with Massimi). Phenomena are sets of observations that are in
some relevant domain, that contrast with all our prior expectations, and so they call
for explanation. Those prior commitments may include theory, to be sure, but often
they do not. That is to say, they do not need to involve theories in the domain un-
der investigation. We all have theories of this or that which set our expectations, or
something that might, with sufficient effort, be cast as theories, but most of what we
expect comes from the exigencies of interacting with the environment, both social and
extrasocial, in order to make a living. That is to say, trial and error, leading to success
or failure in some motivated goal.
6. Explanations
We should consider in each case what Question it is that is proposed, and what answer
to it would, in the instance before us, be the most opposite or contrasted to the one to
be examined. E.G. “You will find this doctrine in Bacon” may be contrasted, either with
“You will find in Bacon a different doctrine,” or with, “You will find this doctrine in a
different author.” [Archbishop Richard Whately, Elements of Logic (Whately 1875, II.
iv. i)].
9Woodward says “Phenomena are stable, repeatable effects or processes that are potential objects of prediction
and systematic explanation by general theories and which can serve as evidence for such theories” (Woodward
2000). I do not deny this definition either.
6 EXPLANATIONS 14
So in order to understand why phenomena are things that call for explanations,
we have to understand why explanations are called for, and for that I turn to the
Contrastive Theory of Explanation (Van Fraassen 1980; Garfinkel 1981).
Anyone who has ever had a child knows the issue with indefinite “why?” questions.
The interrogator asks why for every answer that is given, until the responder gets
tired or emotional. And this is not just a problem with preschool age children, but
also with scientists. It is for this reason – an indefinitely long chain of questions – that
science is divided into investigatory domains, for once one has gotten to the base level
of explanations in a domain, to continue to ask why is to hand off the problem to
another expert group. This prevents scientists from getting emotional, to a degree.
Science is divided in practice into smaller bite-size questions: why does a peacock
have that ridiculous tail? Why does Mercury’s precession not match Newtonian pre-
dictions? What causes X ? Once a question is resolved, experts move onto another
tractable issue in the “field”. Scientific fields, however, are often merely institutional
divisions, and crossing those divisions negatively impacts on the ability of a researcher
or research group to gain funding and respect (one reason why interdisciplinary studies
are looked on askance). So, the limitations of investigation and explanation are often
fairly arbitrary and artificial.
And yet, when a science finds that its division of labor is no longer progressing,
such institutional divisions will often evaporate and be redrawn. Molecular biology,
an amalgam of molecular chemistry and genetics and cytology and developmental
biology (increasingly), and so on, is a good instance of this. In this way, sciences
adapt to a twofold set of pressures: one being social (or, as I have called it in this
series, “constructed”) and the other being natural (“unconstructed”), to produce a
set of problems, explanatory resources, techniques and categories that are natural and
artificial.
In the early 1980s, Bas van Fraassen (1980) and Alan Garfinkel (1981), indepen-
dently came up with an account of explanation which has come to be known as “con-
trastive explanation”. Prior to this, explanation was generally regarded as the pro-
cess of deriving the observed outcome from laws and initial conditions, the so-called
nomological-deductive model10. Van Fraassen and Garfinkel, however, argued that to
explain is to select the best solution from a contrast-class of alternatives for that
problem. In short, to explain is to give a relevant answer to a well-defined question Q.
In van Fraasen’s contrastive model (1980, 142ff), there are three factors in an ex-
planation:
• A Topic, T ; that is, a fact within an investigatory subject.
• A set of contrasts. Lipton (1991) calls these “foils” (F ).
• A relevance relation, R (to exclude answers that are not part of that topic.
A why-question is thus a three-place relation: Q = T, F, R, and an answer to the
Question is of the form:
Fact, T, in contrast to all the alternative foils F, because of Cause.
Or, to put it in ordinary English, that fact is the fact because it isn’t the case that
anything else is the fact because something makes it the fact. This is pretty obvious,
but it points up what an explanation must do—exclude all other possible alternative
facts, in a way that expresses an answer to that question.
10The N-D Model of explanation doesn’t allow for unattached phenomena; all phenomena must be metrics
within a theory.
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This is all abstract (and I have avoided van Fraassen’s notation to try to make it
less so), so let’s use Garfinkel’s unfortunately apocryphal example of Willy Sutton11.
Sutton was a notorious bank robber in the 1920s and 1930s. Once, so the anecdote
goes, Sutton was asked why he robbed banks (the version Garfinkel uses has a priest
asking; other versions have reporters and gaolers). Sutton replied “That’s where the
money is”. The interrogator intended, from context, to ask why Sutton robbed rather
than making an honest living; Sutton, however, had a different contrast-class: robbing
banks versus robbing corner stores, for example. He explains his choice of target, rather
than his choice of activity, by noting the greater return in robbing banks. Much strife
in the history of science has been caused by a failure of competing researchers to set up
the same contrast-class, and often scientists call their opponents (in the social sense)
“unscientific” due a lack of shared contrasts. But that is for another discourse. For
now, I want to focus on how contrast classes cause phenomena to be noted.
A contrast-class is related to the physics notion of a phase space (or a Hilbert
Space, for mathematicians)12. Such a space is defined by a number of axes, each of
which represents an independent variable of the issues or ideas in play, and which can
be of any number of dimensions. Assuming each axis is a set of real numbers, there are
indefinitely many possible coordinates within that space, each one of which represents
in our case a potential answer to a topic question. To answer a question is thus to
assert a coordinate in that space is correct.
Now any scientific field at a given time and place, has an existing set of alterna-
tives within a phase space. And in that field, there are a subset of viable alternative
explanations/foils. The smaller the viable subset, the more consensus there is in that
field. In the case of a field that has a single coordinate explanation, there is 100%
consensus. Generally, though, there is not just one alternative in play. Sometimes the
viability set is dependent upon measurement error, sometimes on variant theoretical
terms, and so on.
Now, suppose a field which has a high consensus (to pluck a figure out of the air,
97%). This means that the experts in the field have a bounded set of expectations for
any new observation. Nobody expects in climate science, for instance, that the next
set of measurements will show a massive cooling, or even a stable set of temperatures.
The explanation for the facts observed over the past 100 years is that CO2 is causing
the retention of heat. Such a phenomenon would be anomalous to the current state of
explanation (i.e., outside the viability space). In fact, it would be the making of the
phenomenon. It would call for an explanation not currently in play.
This is not the only way that phenomena are recognized, of course. If a set of prior
measurements (say, on animal sizes) fell within a distribution curve, prior to a novel
observation of sizes outside that range, this may also trigger recognition of a phe-
nomenon that calls for explanation. Likewise, an entirely novel set of observations (of
a new species, for instance) may be a phenomenon that calls for numerous explana-
tions to be tested. This is how the Starting Problem is overcome. Observers never start
tabula rasa, and so even a prescientific culture can recognize phenomena when there
are no prior explanations to be had, as prior experience sets the limit of expectations,
and thus identifies phenomena. Even a prescientific observer (like a hunter) has prior
expectations, based on cultural inheritances and personal experience.
11Although according to the Quote Investigator <https://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/02/10/
where-money-is/>he may have said it, despite his later denials.
12Ga¨rdenfors (2000) calls this the “geometrical approach to the structure of concepts”. See especially his section
4.4.3.
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To return to the phase space idea, what makes answers viable in that space? There
is no principled answer to that, I think, but one point is that science iteratively refines
its viability spaces over time based largely on empirical data. If your expectations are
that, for instance, orbits will be the shortest geodesics in the gravity well, an orbit that
an explanatory model allows that is not the shortest geodesic is outside the viability
space. As van Fraasen noted, a theory must be empirically adequate13. It must also
force that coordinate, within measurement error, to be that sort of outcome, and so
on. But theory is not the only thing that sets empirical expectations.
So phenomena are things that stand out. What does this mean for natural cate-
gories?
7. Concluding remarks
To summarize: When scientists investigate phenomena, they are implicitly or explicitly
approaching the topic at issue with a set of contrasting categories, which are specified
by the research question. And that set of categories determines what the phenomenon
is. This determinism closely resembles another claim often made in the philosophy of
science and language: that we construct all our categories – that no category is really
realistic. This very popular view is often associated with the theory-dependence of
observation thesis14. Here, though, I am arguing that observation need not be theory
dependent, but it is, and must be, expectation dependent.
Category antirealism is widespread. This often relies on ideas that scientific theo-
ries are all-encompassing worldviews (such as “paradigms”) that determine what we
see, because observations underdetermine explanations and hypotheses. The Starting
Problem, though, indicates that we never approach observation naively, but that we
always have dispositions, either biological or sociocultural or a mixture of both, to
observe some things and not others, out of the infinity of things we might observe.
Science is a process of refining observations based on a process of refining our expecta-
tions (hence the reference to Bayesian logic before). In short, nobody starts knowing
nothing. Science can bootstrap from folk-science because folk-science itself is already
bootstrapped from evolved biological and cultural dispositions.
Natural categories are thus not naive. At the same time, though, they are seen by
experienced observers. The key term here is “experienced”: no observer, whether a
scientist or an enthusiast, begins their observations without prior experience being
passed on by those who went before and taught that observer. Such teaching may be
theoretical, but it may also be ostensive (“like that”), or pragmatic (“you can do this
with these”), and it will be taught through trial and correction by the prior expert.
To return to “species”, experienced observers of species are those who have at their
disposal a range of tools:
• Practical training by prior experts
• Knowledge of related species (and thus expectations about what will be seen, so
that novel features are highlighted)
• Whatever theoretical prior information there may be
• Cognitive ancillary tools, such as what counts as a good explanation in that field.
13There are numerous “theoretical virtues”. See the forthcoming paper by Michael Keas 2017.
14Which I have discussed in Wilkins and Ebach (2013, chapter 6).
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All these go to set up what taxonomists call “good species” (Amitani 2015). The
prior expectations are based on prototypical models of species (in that group of or-
ganisms) so that what fits that model is regarded as a properly describable species;
boundary cases are problems to be resolved. This implies, as I have said before, that
species are not a theoretical category. That is, there is no unique set of biological
groups to which the term “species” applies. It is not a natural category in general.
But it can be a natural category for a group of organisms; say, a group of birds, cats
or plants. If, that is, there are shared ways (modalities, as I called it in 2003) of being
a species in that group. This is, of course, an empirical matter. We have to identify
species as phenomena that share certain modalities for that group, and be able to
identify the exceptions (as in the whiptail lizard asexual species (Reeder et al. 2002)).
This was a long diversion into a simple topic. I wondered if species could be ac-
counted for as phenomena. From that I asked what a phenomenon is. I rejected the
a priori claim that natural categories of science are necessarily derived from theories,
which has long been the default opinion in philosophy of science. And I argued that
phenomena are highlighted as things that stand out from our existing expectations of
the domain in question, using the contrastive account of explanations (but I did not
give any view about what explanation is, because that varies by domain and field).
Why don’t I offer an account of explanation?
In part, as I noted, explanations satisfy local criteria for a field or domain. Con-
sider mountains. How we explain a given mountain depends on the evidence available
(evidence of stratigraphy, isotope ratios, etc.), and theoretical postulates like Steno’s
principles of superposition, original horizontality, continuity, and crosscutting. More-
over, we appeal to causal processes like vulcanism, erosion, uplift, subduction, and so
on, some of which are more theoretical than observed. There are, as in most philo-
sophical debates, especially in the philosophy of science, monists and pluralists on
explanation. Given that in my view (not argued here) there are no unitary, unique
and universal modes of explanation in any field of science, for now, it is enough to
say that explanation sets up the things that need to be explained, but so too do
observation, experience and economic motivations.
Taxa (that is, categories of the natural world) are not therefore de jure objects of
theory, and hence, they are not fully vulnerable to the antirealist attack. But neither
are they ready-made, either in the mind or the “external” world. They are constructed
categories that are held hostage to empirical data, to experience of the world, and to
(as Hacking 1983 it) intervention in that world. And that is enough, I think.
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